

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Department officials said it is very likely there will be a showdown on the quarantine inasmuch as we'll soon know whether the Soviets agree to respect it or not. We are going to stop all ships -- Soviet and Allied -- if they carry arms or munitions. If need be, this will be done with a shot across the bow to force a halt. If this is ignored, the next shot will be into the ship itself. The rule we will follow is a minimum amount of force to provide a maximum opportunity to get a peaceful settlement. Should a Soviet vessel be involved in a stop-and-search, the peaceful settlement lies in the hands of Khrushchev.

The final remarks of the President indicate that the United States will be receptive to proposals for a high level meeting with the Soviets (FYI this recommended in point four of Ambassador Stevenson's letter of October 22 to Valerian

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Zorin, president UN Security Council)

In this connection Department officials said our objective is to obtain the dismantlement of the offensive facilities in Cuba. This we will seek in a resolution to the UN Security Council. If the Soviets veto this resolution and do not take steps to remove the missile facilities, we will take the resolution to the UN General Assembly. In the meantime, we expect to begin taking the measures outlined in the President's 7-point program under a Proclamation issued by the President late tomorrow.

Department officials said that we do not regard the quarantine action as an act of war. They cited Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter as authorizing the OAS to consider the threat to peace posed by the Soviet missile capability in Cuba. We look on the ^{quarantine} ~~quarantine~~ as a sanction appropriate within OAS framework.

We will ask the OAS council tomorrow morning to constitute itself into a consultative committee under the RIO Treaty and will then present it with a resolution embodying the President's seven points for approval. Department officials said we can obtain the needed 14 OAS votes of approval and probably more. They made plain, however, that we look on this action as a use of force to meet a threat to the peace and added that the legal basis for the quarantine does not depend on OAS approval but rather on the inherent right of self-defense. Regarding details of the quarantine itself, Department

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officials said that Soviet ships known not repeat not to be carrying arms probably won't be stopped. They added, however, that the quarantine announced by the President is an initial step that can be extended to other types of cargoes and carriers, and that USG is working on a system of certificates of clearance to tighten quarantine. In this regard, they said the question of the movement of offensive weapons such as nuclear warheads by aircraft is under study and is being discussed with allies whose cooperation would be needed.

In making the distinction between quarantine and blockade, officials said that while a quarantine may have some elements of a blockade, it is usually associated with conduct of war. A quarantine is not an act of war. The quarantine in this case is applied as a purely defensive, not offensive, measure.

The actual Naval operation to enforce the quarantine will be under the command of Admiral Dennison in his capacity as Commander-in-chief, Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANT). (i.e. Dennison not operating in his capacity as Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT) in the NATO command structure.)

There will be no geographical limitations on these naval operations, the officials said. The quarantine will apply wherever needed but in all likelihood will probably be carried out fairly

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from
far out ~~in~~ Cuban waters.

Regarding possible repercussions of the order in other areas such as Berlin or the Far East, officials pointed out that we were prepared for repercussions anywhere in the world. With reference to Berlin it was noted that we have comprehensive contingency plans ready for implementation. These necessary precautions are and would in any case be available to meet a threat to the peace regardless of the Cuban situation.

Every Allied government was advised and informed beforehand. This was supplemented by comprehensive briefings just prior to the President's speech for all the NATO, OAS, SEATO, and Cento mission chiefs here. The neutral missions also were filled in, ~~in accordance~~

~~As~~ To questions about the alleged parallelism between what the Soviets are doing in Cuba and the arrangements we have under NATO jurisdiction for positioning ~~XX~~ ICBM missiles in Italy and Turkey, department officials drew a sharp distinction. They said the missiles in Italy and Turkey were installed as a result of a decision taken by NATO council at the December 1957 meeting of Heads of Government in Paris. This action was publicly announced in the communique issued at the end of that meeting and was taken in consultation with all the NATO members as a defensive measure after announcements and implied threats by the Soviets that they had a medium and intermediate range missiles and were ready to use them.

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Pressed to explain how the character of the Soviet buildup in Cuba had changed so rapidly in the past few days, officials said that intensified phot-reconnaissance has confirmed the intelligence recently coming out of Cuba about the construction of long-range missile sites. Some details were withheld to protect intelligence sources but a rather complete outline of what we know from photo-reconnaissance was given.

Department officials showed actual air reconnaissance photographs of missiles on the sites in Cuba which were identical with missiles photographed at Moscow May Day parades for the past several years. Officials stated that they had no actual evidence of the presence of nuclear warheads but did display photographs of an installation which could be used to store such warheads. It is conceivable that the Soviets are reserving their option of actually controlling the warheads.

Photographs showed two types of offensive missile sites: one for medium range (1020 nautical miles) and the other for intermediate range (2200 nautical miles). The sites, in various stages of construction, each had four launching pads. Photographs showed erecting and handling equipment and missiles on trailers. There was also photographic evidence of a specially secure airport facility in Western Cuba. This facility included buildings under construction and double security fencing.

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CONTINUATION SHEET

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The speed of the buildup was underlined by the presentation of "before" and ~~in~~ "after" photographs, taken at 24-hour intervals. The inventory of other major Soviet weapons now identified in Cuba also includes about 100 MIG jet fighters, of which 39 are of the advanced MIG-21 type and 12 Komar class patrol boats for launching 10-15 mile cruise missiles.

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